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 Optimal Cyclical Monetary Policy:




In general equilibrium models, optimal cyclical monetary policy is usually
derived around an optimal steady-state inﬂation level, which in most cases is
zero or equal to the negative of the real interest rate. This paper examines
whether and how diﬀerent steady-state inﬂation levels and other steady-state
distortions aﬀect the optimal monetary policy response to shocks. This issue is
ﬁrst discussed in general terms. Then, a simple example is presented, where op-
timal policy can be procyclical or countercyclical depending on the steady-state
inﬂation level. This paper suggests that both issues of the choice of inﬂation tar-
get and optimal cyclical monetary policy should be addressed simultaneously,
as steady-state distortions inﬂuence the optimal reaction of monetary policy to
shocks. More generally, the paper shows that assumptions about steady-state
distortions aﬀect the derived optimal cyclical policy.
∗Email: samuel.reynard@snb.ch. This paper was prepared for the joint workshop “Dynamic
Models Useful for Policy” of the Bank of Canada, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the
Swiss National Bank, Ottawa, July 2003. I would like to thank conference participants, as well as
my discussant Allen Head, Charles Carlstrom, Larry Christiano, and Vincenzo Quadrini, for useful
suggestions and comments. I am also grateful to Fernando Alvarez, Jean-Pierre Danthine, Matthias
Doepke, Andreas Fischer, Thomas Jordan, Hashmat Khan, Peter Kugler, Robert Lucas, Jean-Marc
Natal, Enzo Rossi, Barbara Rudolf, Marcel Savioz, Cédric Tille, as well as seminar participants at
the Federal Reserve Board and at the University of Chicago, for helpful comments on the current as
well as an earlier version of this paper. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect
those of the Swiss National Bank.
11. Introduction
In general equilibrium models, optimal cyclical monetary policy is usually derived
after log-linearizing structural equations around a ﬁrst-best steady-state inﬂation
level, which in most cases is zero1 or equal to the negative of the real interest rate2
(Friedman rule). However, those inﬂation levels do not correspond to what we observe
empirically. This paper examines whether and how deviating from those ﬁrst-best
steady-state inﬂation levels aﬀects the optimal monetary policy response to shocks,
or in other words, how diﬀerent inﬂation targets aﬀect the optimal cyclical monetary
policy.
The choice of a higher inﬂation target can be motivated by diﬀerent reasons. First,
inﬂation is potentially able to oﬀset or dampen some distortions, like e.g. imperfect
competition or downward wage rigidities. Then, it is sometimes argued that low
steady-state interest rates provide central bank with less ﬂexibility to react to strong
negative shocks and increase deﬂation risks. I will argue that the choice of steady-
state inﬂation level aﬀects the optimal monetary policy response to shocks, whether
the inﬂation target has been chosen optimally to ease distortions or is sub-optimally
high.
Some studies3 have examined the merit of diﬀerent monetary policy rules in en-
vironments that are not Pareto optimal, and analyzed second-best policies where
1See e.g. Gali (2001), King and Wolman (1999), and Woodford (1999). Often, in models featuring
sticky prices, distortions arising from imperfect competition or from the opportunity cost of holding
money are assumed away, and monetary authorities choose to stabilize the price level in order to
avoid diﬀerent relative prices induced by the lack of synchronization in price adjustments. Another
approach was adopted by King and Wolman, who consider a dynamic optimization problem that
also leads to a zero inﬂation optimum.
2See e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), Fuerst (1994), and Ireland (1996).
3See e.g. Aiyagari and Braun (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995, 1996), and Fuerst (1994, 1998).
2nominal interest rates were strictly positive in order to avoid indeterminacy issues.
In this paper I examine the mechanisms at work that aﬀect optimal cyclical policy
when monetary policy deviates from the standard ﬁrst-best inﬂation levels of zero
or the negative of the real interest rate, whether it does so sub-optimally or to ease
other steady-state distortions, and the consequences of varying steady-state inﬂation
levels for optimal cyclical monetary policy.
The main idea is that in a distorted economy with a striclty positive steady-state
inﬂation, the choice faced by the monetary authority is whether and how to let the
distortion ﬂuctuate when the economy is subject to shocks. In the example studied
below, a varying distortion on one hand lowers average consumption as it does not
allow ﬁrms to let labor covary optimally with productivity, but on the other hand
a distortion relatively high in booms and low in downturns implies a relatively high
distortion when the marginal utility of consumption is low and thus the utility cost
of the distortion is relatively low. Diﬀerent steady-state distortion levels aﬀect those
margins and lead to diﬀerent optimal cyclical monetary policy prescriptions. In other
terms, with diﬀerent levels of steady-state distortion, ﬂuctuations aﬀect households
more or less strongly as the curvature of the utility function diﬀers. The optimal
monetary policy ﬂuctuations smoothing should thus also vary.
In section 2, a general discussion is provided on the mechanisms that aﬀect cyclical
policy when the degree of distortion changes. Then, in section 3, a simple example
is presented, based on a setup proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996), in order
to illustrate the eﬀect of diﬀerent steady-state inﬂation levels and of the role of risk
aversion on optimal cyclical monetary policy. Section 4 concludes.
32. A Discussion of the Mechanisms at Work
This section presents some intuition on the way steady-state inﬂation can aﬀect
the optimal monetary policy response to shocks.
In general equilibrium models, optimal monetary policy is derived by maximizing
the expected utility of a representative household. Let us write its utility as
U [Y (θ,R),L(θ,R)]. (1)
The representative household consumes what its produces, thus consumption equals
production Y , and it supplies labor L to the ﬁrm. Y (θ,R) represents the equilibrium
behavior of output, where the factors of production are already expressed in terms
of the monetary policy instrument R and the underlying shocks θ. R is the gross
nominal interest rate, but it could also represent money growth. L(θ,R) represents
the equilibrium behavior of labor.
There is no consensus on the way to model monetary non-neutrality, but the func-
tion Y (θ,R) can be interpreted in the lights of the diﬀerent theories. First, monetary
policy aﬀects the real economy through steady-state inﬂation. Steady-state inﬂation,
which determines the steady-state nominal interest rate R,c a na ﬀect real output
through shoe-leather costs, through a tax on labor (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1996), or
through relative price distortion (Galí, 2001), for example, depending on the model.
Then, monetary policy can have short-run eﬀects through imperfect information or
nominal rigidities, like e.g. limited participation constraints or stickiness in prices
or wages. In those cases, deviations from steady-state policy, R − R, can generate
short-term non-neutrality.
4The question of interest for this paper is then how would optimal cyclical monetary
policy, represented by R − R,b ea ﬀected by the steady-state inﬂation level, which
determines R. There are several potential reasons that could justify deviating from a
ﬁrst-best zero inﬂation level or from the Friedman rule. Distortions, like e.g. imperfect
competition or downward wage rigidities, could potentially be oﬀset or dampened by
a strictly positive inﬂation level. In this paper however, I do not model such kinds
of distortions. A positive inﬂation level should thus be seen here as sub-optimal
and exogenously imposed. Optimal monetary policy becomes thus the solution of
a second-best problem, which is to maximize expected utility given a sub-optimal
steady-state inﬂation level.
One way to motivate this approach would be to think of a government imposing
an inﬂation target to an independent central bank, which would then be responsible
for the conduct of an optimal cyclical monetary policy. An inﬂation target that is
too high can be thought of as a consequence of misjudgment on the optimal inﬂation
target level, or arising from the fear that low interest rate levels could prevent a
central bank of reacting to strong negative shocks and increase deﬂation risks.
However, the arguments developed in this paper also apply to models where distor-
tions justifying a strictly positive inﬂation level are explicitly modeled and where a
strictly positive steady-state inﬂation level is optimal, as long as the steady-state in-
ﬂation level diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best case that would be characterized in the absence
of those distortions. As soon as distortions are present, whether they are generated by
a strictly positive inﬂation level or by other factors, the resulting allocations should
induce a diﬀerent cyclical monetary policy. In other words, this paper tries to char-
acterize the consequences of assuming away distortions that justify a strictly positive
5inﬂation rate in models that examine optimal monetary policy, or the consequences
of choosing a sub-optimal inﬂation target.
2.1. Optimal Cyclical Monetary Policy
We can represent the monetary policy reaction function as
R = R + δ(θ − 1), (2)
where δ is the coeﬃcient of reaction, and θ is an i.i.d. shock with mean 1 and variance
σ2
θ.
Monetary authorities are maximizing the representative agent’s expected utility.
Taking the expectation of the second-order Taylor approximation of equation (1)
around the steady-state values R = R and θ =1 ,w eo b t a i n











where the upper-bar means that these derivatives are evaluated at their steady-state
values. Under certain conditions, URR and Uθθ are negative4. The central bank cannot
inﬂuence σ2
θ, thus the last term does not aﬀect the second-best maximization problem.
Monetary authorities face a trade-oﬀ. First, depending on the sign and amplitude
of UθR, it will be optimal to let the nominal interest rate covary more or less positively
or negatively with the shock. In other words, the optimal monetary policy reaction
depends on how monetary actions aﬀect the marginal inﬂuence of shocks on utility
4URR n e e d st ob en e g a t i v ef o rt h ep r o b l e mt ob ew e l ld e ﬁned. In this setup, a positive value
for that variable could potentially happen if monetary policy can increase average production by
increasing the variance of the interest rate per se, being more (less) eﬀective at low (high) interest
rates, which does not seem plausible.
6in equilibrium. On the other hand, interest rate ﬂuctuations per se lower welfare,
i.e. URR < 0. The structure of the model will thus determine the optimal degree of
monetary policy reaction to shocks. The inﬂuence of diﬀerent steady-state inﬂation
levels can then be studied through the eﬀect of varying R on the derivatives UθR and
URR.
The optimal monetary policy reaction coeﬃcient δ
∗ can be determined as follows.




























In order to gain intuition on the optimal covariance between the monetary policy
instrument and the productivity shock, as well as on the eﬀect of a change in steady-
state inﬂation on that covariance, it is useful to examine the numerator of (7). From
7equation (1), we can write
UθR = UYYYθYR + UYYθR + UYLYθLR + UYLYRLθ + ULLLθLR + ULLθR. (8)
We can see that the sign and amplitude of the optimal monetary policy response to
shocks depend on the curvature of the utility function as well as on the equilibrium
eﬀects of shocks and monetary policy actions on labor and output. To ﬁnd out the
determinants of optimal cyclical policy and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent steady-state
inﬂation on those determinants, we need to be able to interpret the sign, amplitude
and sensitivity with respect to changes in R of each term, including those in the
denominator, in light of economic theory or empirical evidence. I will focus here on
only a few terms, in order to gain some intuition.
If θ represents a productivity shock, the ﬁrst term at the right-hand side of (8),
UYYYθYR, should be positive, implying a positive covariance between the nominal
interest rate and productivity shocks. This ﬁrst term captures the fact that a positive
covariance between the policy instrument and productivity shocks increases welfare
as it dampens the negative eﬀect of consumption ﬂuctuations.
The second term of equation (8), UYYθR, should be negative and thus push the
covariance between interest rates and productivity shocks in the other direction than
the determinants discussed in the previous paragraph. The main idea behind this
result, which again depends of the speciﬁc model used, is that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor increases with a positive productivity shock, and a decrease in interest
rate increases labor. Thus a positive covariance between interest rates and produc-
tivity shock will increase average output and thus welfare, as the marginal utility of
consumption UY is positive.
8The two ﬁrst terms of equation (8) already show us two forces that pull the optimal
covariance between the policy instrument and productivity shocks in opposite direc-
tions. Consumption smoothing concerns would call for a positive covariance, while
a negative covariance would increase average consumption. The sign of the optimal
covariance will also be inﬂuenced by other model speciﬁcations, like e.g. the way the
disutility of labor is modeled, and the amplitude of that covariance will depend on
the denominator of equation (7) as well, which accounts for the eﬀect of interest rate
variations on utility.
2.2. Eﬀects of Varying Steady-State Inﬂation/Distortions
Concerning the main question addressed in this paper, we see that diﬀerent steady-
state inﬂation levels or other distortions will aﬀect the optimal cyclical policy by inﬂu-
encing the sign and amplitude of the diﬀerent determinants of the optimal covariance
between the policy instrument and the shocks. A higher steady-state inﬂation will
cause the output level to decrease, due either to additional resources spent carrying
out transactions (shoe-leather costs), to a higher tax on labor (Carlstrom and Fuerst,
1996), or to a higher relative price distortion (Galí, 2001), depending of the model.
Lower equilibrium output and labor levels will inﬂuence the diﬀerent derivatives.
For example, households will ﬁnd themselves on a point on the utility curve with
more curvature, i.e. where the absolute value of UYY is larger, and will thus suﬀer
more from output ﬂuctuations. From the ﬁrst term of equation (8), this will push
towards a more positive covariance between the interest rate and shocks. On the
other hand, UY will be larger, thus households will appreciate more the higher average
output generated by a negative covariance between the interest rate and shocks. It
9could also be that at new allocations, the eﬀe c to fs h o c k so ri n t e r e s tr a t ec h a n g e so n
output, Yθ and YR,a r ed i ﬀerent, calling for a diﬀerent monetary policy reaction to
shocks. The net eﬀect will also depend of the other terms of the numerator, and the
amplitude of the change will be determined by the denominator as well.
We can already see that certain model parameters, like e.g. the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion, may play a crucial role. Higher degrees of risk aversion will make house-
h o l d sm o r ea v e r s et oﬂuctuations and thus induce a more positive optimal covariance
between the interest rate and productivity shocks. This fact will be illustrated in
section 3, with the speciﬁc model considered.
We can also see that what applies to a higher distortion generated by a higher in-
ﬂa t i o nt a r g e ta l s oa p p l i e st oa n yo t h e rd i s t o r t i o n .W ec a nu s et h ea n a l y s i sp r e s e n t e d
above to assess how results derived when distortions are assumed away would be af-
fected if those distortions were taken into account. For example, if a distortion like
imperfect competition justiﬁes a higher inﬂation target, the distortion generated by
that higher inﬂation and the remaining imperfect competition distortion that mone-
tary policy could not have oﬀset will aﬀect the steady-state levels of the derivatives
discussed above, and thus the optimal cyclical policy will be aﬀected. In that sense,
log-linearizing structural equations around their ﬁrst-best non-distorted solutions may
lead to diﬀerent prescriptions for the optimal cyclical policy.
The following section illustrates this discussion with a simple example.
103. A Model with Limited Participation Constraint
3.1. Model Description
The purpose of this section is to illustrate with a simple model the inﬂuence of dif-
ferent steady-state inﬂation levels on the optimal monetary policy reaction to shocks.
As Cooley and Quadrini (1999) documented, the Federal Open Market Committee
seems to monitor and react to changes in commercial borrowers’ credit ﬁnancing
conditions. With that reading of the events, when, following a positive productivity
shock, ﬁrms want to expand and the loan market gets tight, the Federal Reserve
would inject liquidity in the system. As Cooley and Quadrini pointed out, the positive
correlation between monetary aggregates and employment may be a consequence of
a policy, which after a positive productivity shock, when output is below its potential
level due to a tighter loan market, would call for a liquidity injection to allow ﬁrms
to take fully advantage of the shock.
The economy considered here is subject to productivity shocks that aﬀect the nom-
inal interest rate at which commercial ﬁrms borrow from households through ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries. Given households’ limited participation constraint in the ﬁnancial
market, loan market conditions are inﬂuenced by productivity shocks, and this aﬀects
labor demand decisions. The central bank has to decide whether to accommodate
these shocks, through a liquidity eﬀect.
The general setup, where open-market operations can generate liquidity eﬀects on
nominal interest rates, is provided by Lucas (1990). Fuerst (1992) incorporates the
production side and interprets the nominal interest rate as the one ﬁr m sf a c ew h e n
paying their workers in advance. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997b) provide
11empirical estimates of the liquidity eﬀect on nominal interest rates and production
following a shock to the money supply, and calibrate a limited participation constraint
model with adjustment costs that could replicate their empirical results.
The underlying model mechanism is as follows. Firms have to use savings from
households to pay their inputs in advance of production, thus factors demand and
output will depend on the nominal interest rate in the loan market. Households
are subject to a limited participation constraint or adjustment costs that introduce
some sluggishness to their savings decision. As a result, the monetary authority
can inﬂuence the nominal interest rate, and thus production, by injecting money
directly to the loan market through the ﬁnancial intermediaries. In other terms,
the central bank can directly aﬀect the relative holding of cash between the diﬀerent
sectors of the economy. After a positive productivity shock, ﬁr m sw i l lw a n tt oe x p a n d
their activity. However, as the supply of loans will not change, due to the limited
participation constraint, there will be upward pressure on the nominal interest rate.
A procyclical monetary policy, which in that case increases the money supply, would
dampen the upward pressures on the nominal interest rate and thus allow ﬁrms to
optimally expand their activity.
A strictly positive nominal interest rate acts like a tax by scaling down employment
and production. The ﬁrst-best outcome is thus obtained by keeping the nominal
interest rate at zero, increasing the money supply when the economy is hit by a
positive productivity shock. In case of a negative shock, the optimal monetary policy
would be indeterminate, because of the non-negativity constraint on the nominal
interest rate. The way previous studies5 have dealt with this issue is to consider only
policies where cash-in-advance constraints for both households and ﬁrms are binding,
5See e.g. Fuerst (1994).
12which imply a procyclical policy even in the event of a negative productivity shock.
When we depart from the ﬁrst-best outcome, and allow for a positive average inﬂation
rate, the indeterminacy disappears but we are left with second-best policies. Previous
studies have compared diﬀerent second-best policies for a given distortion. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1996) show that a nominal interest rate peg is superior, in terms of
welfare, to a money growth peg with the same average distortion level. They relate
that ﬁn d i n gt ot h er e s u l tt h a tac o n s t a n tt a xi sp r e f e r r e dt oav a r i a b l eo n e ,a sas t r i c t l y
positive nominal interest rate acts as a tax on labor demand in this model. Moreover,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) provide numerical results in favor of a nominal interest
rate peg over a constant money supply growth rate rule by comparing two economies
with the same non-stochastic steady-state level of capital and nominal interest rate.
Here I use the setup proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst, and examine the con-
sequences of varying steady-state inﬂation levels for the optimal cyclical monetary
policy. Instead of ranking the two pegs, i.e., money growth and interest rate pegs,
I derive the optimal policy, which can be somewhere in between the two pegs, and
examine how diﬀerent steady-state distortions aﬀect the optimal policy. If for low
steady-state inﬂation levels it is optimal to allow ﬁrms to adjust their labor demand
to productivity shocks, for higher inﬂation levels and thus larger distortions, con-
sumption smoothing concerns become more important, and monetary policy will not
necessarily dampen the oﬀsetting eﬀect of interest rate movements on output.
The section is organized as follows. In section 3.2, the model and its equilibrium
are presented. Section 3.3 compares the ﬁrst-best with equilibrium outcomes. In
section 3.4, the second-best policy for a given average nominal interest rate is derived.
Calibration is presented in section 3.5, and results from the calibrated model are
13displayed in section 3.6.
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Household





tU (Ct,L t), (9)
where C and L are consumption and labor, respectively, and β i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r .
The household is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint; it keeps the amount of
cash (Mt − Nt) to purchase goods at period t, and sends Nt to the ﬁnancial interme-
diary, at the beginning of the period, where Mt is the money balances carried over
from t − 1. At the end of the period, it gets the return RtNt from its deposit (R is
the gross nominal interest rate), and the proﬁts RtXt from the ﬁnancial intermediary
and Dt from the ﬁrm.
The constraints it faces are thus
PtCt ≤ Mt − Nt + WtLt, (10)
Mt+1 = Rt (Nt + Xt)+Dt +( Mt − Nt + WtLt − PtCt), (11)
and
0 ≤ Nt ≤ Mt, (12)
where Pt, Wt and Xt are the price, wage, and monetary injection from the central bank
14to the ﬁnancial market, respectively. The problem of the household is thus to choose
the sequence {Ct,L t,N t,M t+1}
∞
t=0 to maximize its utility subject to the constraints
above.
The household is subject to a limited participation constraint, i.e. Nt has to be
function only of Mt and variables dated t−1 and earlier. Thus the household has to
choose the amount it sends to the intermediary without knowing the realization of
the current shock on production; neither does it know the size of the money injection,
Xt = MS
t+1 − MS
t , if the latter is a function of the shock of the current period.
The information sets are represented as follow:
Ωt includes all the variables dated t and earlier;
ΩN
t includes the variables known to the household when the latter chooses Nt, i.e.
Ωt−1 and Mt.
To express the household’s problem in a recursive form, we normalize the nominal
















where a prime denotes next period variable.
The Bellman equation is then










pC ≤ m − n + wL (14)
15and
(1 + x)m ´= R(n + x)+d +( m − n + wL− pC). (15)
We assume that productivity shocks are i.i.d. First order conditions are presented in
appendix 1.














, for σ =1 . (17)
The labor supply elasticity is 1
ψ. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997a) pro-
pose a way to reconcile this utility function with balanced growth. This form of utility
function, which implies a zero income eﬀect on leisure, is chosen so that ﬁrst-best and
equilibrium employment are both procyclical in the model, for any coeﬃcient of risk
aversion. This would not be the case with the functional form U = C1−σ−1
1−σ − V (L),
where V 0 ≥ 0 and V 00 ≥ 0, given the chosen form of the production function. With
the latter utility function, equilibrium employment would not respond to produc-
tivity shocks when money growth is constant, and optimal employment would be
countercyclical for σ>1.
3.2.2. Firm
The production function has the form
y = K + θL
α. (18)
16The productivity shock θ has a mean of unity and variance σ2
θ. This production
function was suggested by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) to capture some stylized
facts with a simple model. Physical capital is assumed constant and enters additively.
With this speciﬁcation, nominal interest rates move procyclically when money growth
is constant. This would be the case with a Cobb-Douglas production function when
physical capital accumulation is taken into account. With K =0 , the nominal interest
rate does not react to productivity shocks, and moves only with changes in the money
growth rate, as explained in appendix 2. However, the results of this paper remain
the same whether K =0or K 6=0 : the optimal cyclical monetary policy does diﬀer
for diﬀerent steady-state inﬂation levels.
We assume that the ﬁrm chooses labor demand to maximize the discounted value
of its dividend payments to the household (shareholder), and is subject to a cash-
in-advance constraint: it has to borrow to pay its wage bill at the beginning of the





















As the household is also subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, the ﬁrm discounts
the proﬁt at time t with the marginal utility of consumption and price at time t+1.
The ﬁrst order condition is then
αPtθtL
α−1
t = RtWt. (21)
173.2.3. Financial Intermediary
At the beginning of the period, the representative competitive ﬁnancial intermedi-
ary collects the money the household sends to it, Nt, and receives a money injection
from the central bank, Xt = MS
t+1 − MS
t . It then lends that entire amount to the
ﬁrm, clearing the ﬁnancial market:
WtLt = Nt + Xt. (22)
At the end of the period, the ﬁnancial intermediary collects the loan (capital plus
interest) from the ﬁrm, Rt (Nt + Xt), and pays back the deposit (capital plus interest)
to the household, RtNt. The proﬁt, RtXt, is then also distributed to the household.
3.2.4. Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to be able to react to the contemporaneous produc-
tivity shock. The monetary policy could be modeled either as
x = x + δx (θ − 1), (23)
or as
R = R + δ(θ − 1). (24)
If the central bank sets the nominal interest rate, the money supply will be deter-
mined endogenously, in the sense that it will have to be adjusted by the central bank
to implement the interest rate rule.
183.2.5. Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of allocation functions C (θ),L(θ),n,and price functions
R(θ),p(θ),w(θ), such that the household maximizes utility and ﬁrms maximize
proﬁts given the price functions, and the goods, loan and money markets clear, for
each realization of the productivity shock, given the monetary policy x(θ).T h e





















t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t
C = K + θL
α, (28)
the loan market clearing
wL = n + x, (29)
the household cash constraint, which combined with (29) leads to
pC =1+x, (30)
given the monetary policy
x = x + δx (θ − 1). (31)
19The labor and money market clearing conditions have been imposed. By Walras Law,
the household’s budget constraint is satisﬁed.
In the analysis below I will characterize the second-best policy in terms of
a nominal interest rate rule of the form R = R + δ(θ − 1). This latter equation
will thus replace equation (31), and money supply will be determined by equilibrium
conditions.
3.3. Solving for First-Best and Equilibrium Employment




















Thus, from equation (33), optimal employment is procyclical. Let us set ψ0 = α,s o
that optimal employment is unity at steady-state.
The behavior of equilibrium employment over the cycle depends on the covariance
between the nominal interest rate and productivity shocks. The ratio of optimal over








(1 + ψ − α)
.
If monetary policy is non-activist, i.e. with a constant money growth rule, R
will be positively correlated with the productivity shock, as explained in appendix
2, and this ratio will vary over the cycle, increasing in booms, and decreasing in
recessions. Optimality is obtained by keeping R at unity, which implies injecting
money after a positive productivity shock that would otherwise raise the nominal
interest rate. A zero net nominal interest rate would however lead to a non-unique
optimal monetary policy, as nominal interest rates cannot go below zero. For example,
Fuerst (1994) deals with this multiplicity problem by assuming that both cash-in-
advance constraints (household and ﬁrm) are always binding, thus monetary policy
is procyclical even after a negative productivity shock.
Targeting a strictly positive inﬂation level will imply a steady-state gross nominal
interest rate higher than unity. The fundamental issue addressed in this paper is to
ﬁgure out what is the second-best ratio (34) as a function of productivity shocks, for a
given sub-optimal steady-state gross interest rate higher than one, and what this does
imply for monetary policy, or equivalently, what is the optimal behavior of the nomi-
nal interest rate when the central bank targets a strictly positive inﬂation level. The
strictly positive inﬂation target is exogenously imposed, thus the maximization prob-
lem becomes a second-best problem. The motivations for that exogenously imposed
sub-optimal inﬂation target were discussed in section 2.
Section 3.4 characterizes the optimal cyclical monetary policy, and section 3.6 pro-
vides numerical results. In appendix 2 an equilibrium analysis of the model is pre-
sented, where the implications of the assumption that K 6=0are developed.
213.4. Solving for the second-best policy
In this section, the optimal cyclical behavior of the nominal interest rate is charac-
terized by deriving an optimal nominal interest rate rule6 for diﬀerent pre-speciﬁed
levels of steady-state nominal interest rate corresponding to diﬀerent steady-state
inﬂation levels. We will be looking at a monetary policy rule of the form R =
R + δ (θ − 1).
Using equation (32) for equilibrium employment and the utility function (16), the
utility of the representative household can be expressed as a function of the nominal
















As in section 2.1, we can take the expectation of the second-order Taylor approx-
imation of this expression around the steady-state values R = R and θ =1 ,a n d
obtain











where the upper-bar means that these derivatives are evaluated at their steady-state





,w h e r eURR < 0, for a given steady-state R that has been ex-
ogenously imposed.
If UθR =0 , which would be the case for a utility function of the form U =
ln(C)−L in this simple model, a policy that pegs the nominal interest rate is better
6The optimal behavior of the money supply can be recovered from the equilibrium conditions.
22than any other policy, with same mean R, that causes variations in the nominal inter-
est rate. This is the result obtained by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) when seigniorage
is kept constant across the two regimes7. However, as mentioned in section 3.2.1, with
that utility function equilibrium employment does not react to productivity shocks
when money growth is constant, and ﬁrst-best employment becomes countercyclical
for higher degrees of risk aversion. Adopting the utility function (16) allows us to
get around both these features and will lead to interesting results for second-best
monetary policy. Moreover, with more fully speciﬁed models, there is no reason to
expect that UθR =0 .
In case UθR > 0, a monetary policy implying a positive covariance between interest
rates and productivity shocks, like a constant money growth rate for example, could
potentially dominate a nominal interest rate peg. We will see below that this can
be the case. The most important aspect with regard to the issue addressed in this
paper is that UθR varies with diﬀerent steady-state nominal interest rates and thus
with diﬀerent inﬂation targets.
As discussed in section 2.1, the second-best policy is deﬁned as the optimal
reaction of the nominal interest rate to the productivity shock, and takes the form
R = R + δ
∗ (θ − 1) (37)
where δ
∗ is chosen so as to maximize expected utility (36), for a pre-speciﬁed R.
7Given that UθR =0in their model, optimal monetary policy will be determined by the sign of
URR. With their model speciﬁcations, ﬂuctuations in interest rate per se increase labor and output,
thus ﬂuctuations in interest rates will increase welfare by raising average output, and decrease welfare
by increasing average labor and by causing ﬂuctuations in consumption. For R>2, URR becomes
positive in their model, thus the optimal monetary policy then would be to generate an inﬁnite
variance of the interest rate.







We will then compare the optimal response of the nominal interest rate to produc-
tivity shocks, i.e. δ
∗, to the equilibrium response of the nominal interest rate when
monetary policy is non-activist, i.e. when money supply growth is kept constant.
We approximate the behavior of the nominal interest rate in the non-activist case by
taking the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of equation (49) around
θ =1 , thus getting an expression of the form
R = R + δ
e (θ − 1). (39)
δ
e will then be compared to δ
∗ in (37) for diﬀerent values of R, in order to see how
much ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate are smoothed (or ampliﬁed) with the
optimal monetary policy compared to the non-activist policy, for diﬀerent R.
Here a non-activist policy is understood as a policy that keeps money growth con-
stant. Thus a positive covariance of the nominal interest rate with the productivity
shock does not necessarily mean that the monetary policy is activist, as the lim-
ited participation constraint causes the equilibrium interest rate to increase with a
productivity shock when money growth is kept constant. A pro- (counter-)cyclical
monetary policy will thus dampen (exacerbate) the interest rate response to a produc-
tivity shock, relative to its equilibrium response in the non-activist case, by injecting
(withdrawing) money to (from) the ﬁnancial sector.
243.5. Calibration
α is set to 0.7. In order to obtain a steady-state labor share of 0.64, K is set to
0.09375. The period unit is a quarter, thus β is set to 1.03−.25. ψ =1 , implying a
unit labor supply elasticity. Results for diﬀerent coeﬃcients of risk aversion σ will be
displayed.
3.6. Results
The following results illustrate the potential importance of varying the steady-state
inﬂation level for the optimal cyclical monetary policy. Results for diﬀerent average
quarterly gross nominal interest rates, and the corresponding annual inﬂation rates,
are presented in Table 1. R and δ
∗ are from the optimal rule (37).
R Inﬂation (%) δ
∗ when σ =1 δ
∗ when σ =3 δ
∗ when σ =5
1 -3 0 0 0
1.0075 0 -.003 .04 .08
1.0125 2 -.005 .06 .13
1.02 5 -.008 .10 .22
1.03 10 -.013 .16 .33
Table 1. Optimal Policy, Inﬂation Target and Risk Aversion
The equilibrium response8 of the nominal interest rate to productivity shocks when
the monetary policy is non-activist, i.e. with a constant money supply growth rule,
δ
e in equation (39), is 0.28.T h eﬁrst-best monetary policy completely smooths the
nominal interest rates at its zero level, i.e. δ
∗ =0 , and allows employment to react
to shocks in an optimal way.
Consider now the last column, i.e. when σ =5 . When the average inﬂation rate is
8δ
e varies only very slightly with the diﬀerent steady-states.
250 percent, the optimal monetary policy is still procyclical as it dampens ﬂuctuations
in the nominal interest rate, i.e. δ
∗ <δ
e. However, as average inﬂation increases,
monetary policy becomes less procyclical and allows the nominal interest rate to vary
more. If the central bank chooses the inﬂation target between 5 and 10 percent for
which δ
∗ equals .28, it should adopt a constant growth rate of the money supply,
without reacting to economic disturbances, as in that case δ
∗, the optimal reaction
to shocks, is equal to δ
e, the equilibrium reaction to shocks when monetary policy
is non-activist, i.e. does not react to shocks. For higher inﬂation rates, the optimal
monetary policy becomes countercyclical, i.e. the central bank withdraws money
when a positive productivity shock occurs, thus exacerbating the rise in interest rate.
Considering the two last columns, i.e. when σ =3and σ =5 ,w es e et h a tt h eo p t i -
mal cyclical policy becomes less accommodative when the inﬂation target increases,
i.e. the optimal covariance between the policy instrument R and productivity shocks
increases with inﬂation. Optimal cyclical policy switches from procyclical to counter-
cyclical as the inﬂation target increases, reﬂecting the fact that in a more distorted
economy, ﬂuctuations in consumption become more painful to households, thus the
central bank will dampen output ﬂuctuations following productivity shocks, as dis-
cussed in section 2.2. Note also that the higher the degree of risk aversion, the more
monetary policy will dampen output ﬂuctuations, as the more these ﬂuctuations are
painful for risk-averse households.
Thus, when the average distortion level is small, it is worth it to smooth nominal
interest rates. This will allow equilibrium employment to react as ﬁrst-best employ-
ment does and thus achieve a higher average consumption level. However, from a
certain level of risk aversion, as we depart signiﬁcantly from the ﬁrst-best outcome it
26becomes less attractive to have employment reacting to shocks and utility smoothing
concerns become more important.
Considering now the case where σ =1 , we see that monetary policy becomes more
procyclical, i.e. goes beyond nominal interest rate smoothing, when the level of dis-
tortion increases. This reﬂects the fact that for less risk-averse households, the gains
in obtaining a higher output level on average, by letting employment covary positively
with productivity shocks, more than oﬀset the loss of higher output ﬂuctuations, as
they suﬀer less from them. This comes from the fact that the larger the distortion,
the larger the marginal utility of that extra average consumption will be.
4. Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to try understanding how diﬀerent steady-state inﬂation
levels could aﬀect optimal cyclical monetary policy. Alternatively, the paper examines
how accounting for steady-state distortions aﬀect the derivation of optimal cyclical
policy. Due to the presence of short-term rigidities, monetary policy can aﬀect the
equilibrium response of macroeconomic variables to shocks. This paper shows that
t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yr e s p o n s et os h o c k si sd e p e n d e n to ft h ed e g r e eo fs t e a d y - s t a t e
distortion, thus the derived optimal monetary policy rule is dependant of assumptions
about the steady-state inﬂation level and other steady-state distortions. The main
idea behind this result is that introducing a second distortion can improve welfare,
as by varying the short-term interest rate in response to shocks, the central bank can
allow households to attain the allocation they would have chosen in the absence of
short-term rigidities for a given steady-state distortion.
The implications for monetary policy and for research on monetary policy rules
27are that, ﬁrst, the issue of optimal cyclical monetary policy should be addressed
simultaneously with the choice of optimal inﬂation target. And second, whether or
not we account for various steady-state distortions will aﬀect the results regarding
optimal cyclical monetary policy.
While this paper has examined diﬀerent mechanisms and provided with a simple
numerical example showing the potential importance of diﬀerent inﬂation targets on
optimal cyclical monetary policy, a more fully speciﬁed and calibrated model, with
diﬀerent types of short-term rigidities, shocks, and distortions justifying a higher
inﬂation target, are needed to obtain quantitative assessment of the importance of
the issue addressed. This is left for future work.
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30Appendix 1: First order conditions of the Household’s Problem
Let ν and µ be the multipliers associated with the cash-in-advance constraint and
the law of motion of money demand, respectively. The ﬁrst order and envelope
conditions are then as follows:
FOC w/r/to C:
UC =( ν + µ)p (40)
FOC w/r/to L:
UL +( ν + µ)w =0 (41)
FOC w/r/to m ´ :
βVm ´= µ(1 + x) (42)
FOC w/r/to n:
EΩN [ν + µ(1 − R)] = 0 (43)
Env. w/r/to m:
Vm = EΩN [ν + µ] (44)









EΩN [ν´+ µ ´] . (46)
31Appendix 2: Equilibrium Analysis
In this appendix, the special case where α =1is examined, which leads to closed
form solutions for employment and the nominal interest rate. Results will be derived
alternatively for K 6=0and K =0 .







where s is deﬁned as the share of the money stock, after the current period injection,
held by intermediaries. As n must be chosen before the productivity shock occurs, s
depends on the shocks only through the response of monetary policy to shocks, i.e.
via x(θ) in (31).
Let ψ =1 . Substituting (25) and (28) in (47), we obtain employment as a function

























32With K>0, the increase in the nominal interest rate dampens the equilibrium
response of employment to productivity shocks, whereas, as we will see below, in the
case K =0nominal interest rate does not react to shocks when money growth x is
constant.
Equalizing (48) with (32) leads to an expression determining the behavior of the








Thus the nominal interest rate is procyclical when money growth is constant.





thus R would be independent of the productivity shock when money growth is kept
constant, as s d e p e n d so nm o n e t a r yp o l i c yo n l y .
The reason why we need a strictly positive K for the nominal interest rate to
react to productivity shocks in this model can be understood as follows. Multiplying
the marginal productivity of labor by equilibrium employment and further by the
price level in (30), we obtain the wage bill, which has to be ﬁnanced by loans, at the
nominal interest rate R. We thus obtain
(1 + x)
αθLα
K + θLα = RwL = R(n + x).
However, when the monetary policy is non-activist, wL is independent of the pro-
ductivity shock, as it is equal to the loans supply which is determined before the
shock is observed. Thus if K =0 , R would be unresponsive to productivity shocks,
33as movements in the price level would exactly oﬀset changes in productivity.
34